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Labour Supply Implications 
of a Négative Income Tax Plan 
Arun S. Roy 
This study demonstrates that a Négative Income Tax 
Plan can be expected to resuit in fairly large réductions in 
the supply of work effort in the case of younger workers. 
Thepotential réductions in labour supply offemale workers 
appear to be particularly large. 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
When a Négative Income Tax (henceforth referred to as NIT)1 plan is in-
troduced, the allocation décision of an individual worker between market 
and non-market activities can be represented as maximizing a utility fonc-
tion of the following form:2 
(i) u = u (x, N); au o, au o 
ax ON 
subject to the budget constraint 
(2) X - G - (1 -a) [WL + Y] = 0 
where 
[WL + Y] < B 
* ROY, Arun S., Stratégie Planning and Research Division, Employment and Immigra-
tion Canada. 
** The présent paper is a condensed version of the paper presented at the European 
Meeting of the Econometric Society held at Vienna, Austria, September, 1977. The views ex-
pressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Department with which the author is 
employed. The author wishes to thank Professors R.G. BODKIN, T.J. COURCHENE, C.S. 
CLARK, M.J. ROBERTSON and Karnail SINGH for many helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. The author is, however, responsible for errors, if any. 
1 For a discussion of the case for a NIT and several of its variants, see GREEN (1967) 
and GOLLADAY and HAVEMAN (1977). 
2 It is assumed that the utility function is "well-behaved" and possesses the usual pro-
perties, viz., the function is twice differentiable and that the second order conditions hold. 
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and where N = time spent on non-market activity; L = time spent on 
market activity; W = market wage rate; X = total income which includes 
income from non-employment sources; X E WL + Y, where Y is non-
employment income;3 G = minimum guaranteed income; a = négative tax 
rate (0<« < 1); B = "break-even" level of income (B = G la by définition) 
The budget constraint implies that if the family's income before in-
come subsidy is nil, it receives the full income subsidy, G. As the family's 
income [WL + Y] increases, the income subsidy gets reduced by the tax 
rate,a. The budget constraint as specified above further implies that the 
family will be eligible for income subsidy only if its income before income 
subsidy is less than the break-even level of income, B. 
By introducing the Lagrangian multiplier and by using Cramer's Rule, 
and also after making several substitutions, the solution for labour supply 
can be written in the following differential équation from assuming that W 
and Y are given exogenously4. 
dL
 • - TÎSÔ( w ) • ? + jàr[dG - on. • Y) da] § 
Note that a change in the level of the income guarantee per se has only 
an income effect on labour supply and no substitution effect. But a change 
in the négative tax rate per se has both an income effect as well as a substitu-
tion effect on labour supply. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A labour supply function was fitted by applying a Two Stage Least 
Squares procédure in the following form:5 
( 4 ) 
L = a + a . W + et-Y + Z B . K . + e . 0 1 2 •
 1 î î 
3 Due to data limitations, income of the spouse or of any other earning member in the 
family is treated in the présent study as non-employment income of the individual in question. 
4 For dérivation of this resuit, see Poddar (ROY) (1976). 
5 In the first stage observed non-employment income and wage rate were regressed on 
ail exogenous variables. In the second stage (see Eqn. (4) above), the fitted values of non-
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where L = individual worker's labour supply; W = individual worker's fit-
ted wage rate; Y = fitted non-employment income; K = a set of "control" 
variables that are expected to influence the individual worker's labour supp-
ly;6 € = a random error term. 
Equation (4) was estimated for younger maies and younger females in 
separate régressions7. The estimâtes of the income and substitution effects 
of a change in the wage rate were derived from the labour supply functions 
of the form represented by Equation (4). Thèse income and substitution 
parameters were then substituted into Equation (3) and simulations were 
obtained at alternative combinations of the minimum guarantee level, G, 
and the négative tax rate, a. The variables, W, L, and Y in Equation (3) 
refer to equilibrium values of the wage rate, labour supply, and non-
employment income respectively. Sample means of thèse variables were us-
ed as equilibrium values. 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The présent study is based on a sample of unemployed workers who 
had approached Canada Manpower Centres for jobs. This was a national 
sample survey covering ail Canada Manpower Centres during June, 1970 
(Survey of Unemployed CMC Clients). The présent study focuses on a 
selected group of younger workers aged 14-24, excluding those who had 
engaged in any schooling activity during the one year preceding the survey. 
In Table 1, potential changes in the annual weeks of labour force par-
ticipation are shown for younger maies and females at varying combina-
tions of G (minimum guarantee level) and a (négative tax rate). At a given 
négative tax rate, every increase in the guarantee level results in a larger 
réduction in labour supply. For instance, for youth maies at a given tax rate 
of .30, every $1,000 increase in the guarantee level reduces labour supply by 
3.1 weeks. Also at a given guarantee level every increase in the tax rate 
employment income and wage rate were used as the appropriate regressors. Différent combina-
tions of controlled variables were used in the two stages to take care of the identification pro-
blem. A Two Stage Least Squares method (or strictly speaking an Instrumental variables ap-
proach) was used to purge the income coefficient of any cross-substitution ef fect and a possible 
estimation bias. For a discussion on this point see Poddar (ROY) (1976), pp. 26-29. 
6 Thèse control variables were âge, éducation, working status of spouse, marital status, 
area unemployment rate, and variables to make ajustment for occupational and régional varia-
tions in labour supply. 
7 Step-wise régressions were run with weeks of labour force participation (weeks 
employed plus weeks looking for work during the past twelve-month period) as the dépendent 
variable. The régression results can be obtained from the author on request. 
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TABLE 1 
Potential Changes in Labour Supply at Varying Combinations 
of Négative Tax Rate and Guarantee Level -
Youth Maies and Youth Females 
\ a MALES FEMALES 
G($î\ .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 
2,000 - 5,4 - 6 - 7,9 - 7,4 
3,000 - 8,5 - 9 -11,2 -13,5 - 8,1 - 7,6 -18,9 -27,8 
4,000 -11,6 -12 -15,6 -18,5 -24,5 - 8,3 - 7,8 -19,1 -28,0 -43,5 
5,000 -14,7 -15 -20 -23,5 -31,5 - 8,5 - 8,0 -19,3 -28,2 -43,8 
6,000 -17,8 -18 -24,4 -28,5 -38,5 - 8,7 - 8,2 -19,5 -28,4 -44,1 
NOTES: 
Labour supply in the présent study refers to the annual weeks of labour force participa-
tion. 
Income and substitution parameters obtained from the TSLS régressions hâve been used 
for simulation. For youth maies: substitution effect = .09 and income coefficient = 
-.0022. For youth females: substitution effect = .32 and income coefficient = -.0001. 
Thèse income and substitution parameters continue to be used in Tables 2 to 4. 
Mean values of the wage rate and labour supply for the samples hâve been used as 
equilibrium values. 
A pre-subsidy family income of $5,000 has been assumed for simulations shown in this 
table. 
results in a larger réduction in labour supply. On the other hand, an increase 
in the guarantee level keeping the (négative) tax rate constant, leads to a 
smaller réduction in labour supply in the case of younger females than 
maies. This is because an increase in income subsidy has only an income ef-
fect (and no substitution effect) and the magnitude of the income effect has 
been found to be very small for younger females (see Notes at the end of 
Table 1). 
In the case of youth maies, at the mean pre-subsidy income level of the 
sample (weighted by income distribution of the group), the selected scheme 
(G = $5,000; «= .50)8 is expected to reduce labour supply by 19.1 weeks 
annually9 - ten weeks being attributable to the income effect and nine weeks 
to the substitution effect (see Table 2). 
8 For easy comparisons, the same parameters are used in Tables 2 to 4. 
9 If a guarantee level of $4,000 is applied, the négative tax rate remaining the same (i.e., 
a = .50), this would imply a labour supply réduction of 15 weeks approximately. And at a 
guarantee level of $3,000, this would imply a labour supply réduction of 10 weeks. 
TABLE 2 
Potential Changes in Labour Supply Due to Introduction of 
a Selected NIT - Youth Maies and Youth Females 
NIT Parameters: G (minimum guarantee level) = $5,000, 
a (négative tax rate) = .50; B (break-even income level) = $10,000 
MALE 
Pre-Subsidy 
Income (X) 
$ 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
6,000 
7,000 
8,000 
9,000 
10,000 
Weighted Mean 
5,400 
(5,560 for females) 
? to Income Due to Total 
Effect Substitution Effect 
(weeks) (weeks) (weeks) 
-15,4 -9 -24,4 
-13,2 -9 -22,2 
-11,0 -9 -20,0 
- 8,8 -9 -17,8 
- 6,6 -9 -15,6 
- 4,4 -9 -13,4 
- 2,2 -9 -11,2 
0 -9 - 9 
FEMALE 
? to Income Due to 
Effect Substitution 
(weeks) Effect 
(weeks) 
-.7 -18,6 
-.6 -18,6 
-.5 -18,6 
-.4 -18,6 
-.3 -18,6 
-.2 -18,6 
-.1 -18,6 
0 -18,6 
-10,1 -9 -19,1 18,6 
Total 
Effect 
(weeks) 
-19,3 
-19,2 
-19,1 
-19,0 
-18,9 
-18,8 
-18,7 
-18,6 
-19,0 
NOTES: 
1. See Notes 1 to 3 at the end of Table 1. 
2. The same NIT parameters continue to be used in Table 3 and 4. 
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In the case of youth females also, the expected réduction is 19 weeks 
annually - almost the whole of this being attributable to the substitution ef-
fect10. Relative to the mean labour supply, this implies a larger réduction in 
the case of females (63 per cent) than in the case of maies (48 per cent)11. 
The implications of the expected réductions in labour supply for in-
come levels of the target group are indicated in Table 3 for maies and Table 
4 for females12. See notes at the end of Table 3. 
In Table 3 and Table 4, the différence between the final transfer and 
the initial supplément reflects the effect of réductions in labour supply on 
the transfer cost of the program. It provides a measure of the extent to 
which transfer costs will be under-estimated by the failure to take labour 
supply effects into account. The présent study shows that the addition to the 
transfer cost of the selected program due to labour supply réductions is like-
ly to be quite substantial for younger workers. As a proportion to the initial 
subsidy, addition to the transfer cost due to réductions in labour supply is 
estimated to be 56 per cent for younger maies and 78 per cent for younger 
females. 
The increase in income level after adjustments hâve been made for loss 
in earnings resulting from labour supply réductions is 19 per cent of the pre-
subsidy income in the case of maies and 8 per cent in the case of females. 
The increase in income per $100 of transfer is estimated to be $28 in the 
case of maies and $12 in the case of females. 
To sum up, this study demonstrates that a NIT can be expected to 
resuit in fairly large réductions in the supply of work effort in the case of 
younger workers having characteristics similar to the samples used in the 
présent study. The potential réductions in labour supply of female workers 
appear to be particularly large. Subject to qualifications noted above it will 
thus be more expensive to raise the income level of those households where 
a large proportion of income cornes from younger earners in gênerai and 
younger female earners in particular. 
io If a guarantee level of $4,000 is applied, the négative tax rate remaining the same (i.e., 
a = .50), this would imply a labour supply réduction of 18.8 weeks. And at a guarantee level of 
$3,000, this would imply a labour supply réduction of 18.6 weeks. 
n The effect of the current income tax is ignored. 
12 In estimating the effect of a réduction in time spent in labour force on income, it has 
been assumed that the pre-subsidy income consists of only earned income and the household 
consists of only one earning member. This means that for families with other sources of in-
come or with earning members other than the respondent, estimated losses in earnings will be 
less than those shown in Tables 3 and 4. It has also been assumed that the number of weeks of 
employment is diminished in the same proportion as the number of weeks spent in the labour 
force. 
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TABLE 3 
Potential Impact of a Selected NIT on Labour Supply 
and Income - Youth Maies 
NIT Parameters: G (minimum guarantee level) = $5,000, 
or (négative tax rate) = .50; B (break-even income level) 
Pre-Subsidy Initial Per Cent Loss in Post-
Income (X) Income Réduction in Earnings Subsidy 
($) Supplément Labour ($) Income 
($) Supply E ($) 
I P X' 
0 5,000 — — 5,000 
3,000 3,500 61 1,830 5,585 
4,000 3,000 55 2,200 5,900 
5,000 2,500 50 2,500 6,250 
6,000 2,000 45 2,700 6,650 
7,000 1,500 39 2,730 7,135 
8,000 1,000 34 2,720 7,640 
9,000 500 28 2,520 8,240 
10,000 0 23 230 9,885 
Weighted Mean 
5,400 2,300 48 2,592 6,404 
NOTES: 
1. The différence between the pre-subsidy income (X) and the break-even level of income (B) 
times the négative tax rate (a) gives the amount of the supplément that each family would 
receive in the absence of any change in its earnings from the pre-subsidy income. Thus the 
initial income subsidy, I = (BpX) a . 
2. Assuming that the pre-subsidy income consists entirely of earnings of the respondent, we 
apply the total percentage réduction in labour force participation (p) to get the loss in earn-
ings (E) due to a réduction in the labour supply. Thus E = X. p. 
3. The post-subsidy income (X') is obtained as the pre-subsidy income, X, plus the initial in-
come subsidy, I, less the portion of lost earnings that is not filled in through a further in-
crease in the subsidy. Thus X' = X + I p ( l - a )E . 
4. The final transfer (FT) equals the initial income subsidy, I, plus the amount required to fill 
in lost earnings at the tax rate of the scheme.a. Thus FT = I + a E . 
5. Also see Notes 1 to 3 at then end of Table 1. 
A COMPARISON WITH FINDINGS BY OTHER RESEARCHERS 
In the U.S.A. (and to a limited extent in Canada), research on labour 
supply implications of a négative income tax plan has proceeded along two 
channels: 
$10,000 
Final 
Transfer 
($) 
FT 
5,000 
4,415 
4,100 
3,750 
3,350 
2,865 
2,360 
1,760 
115 
3,596 
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(i) a number of Négative Income Tax (NIT) experiments hâve been 
conducted;13 and 
(ii) a séries of nonexperimental studies hâve been made by individual 
researchers from time to time. 
TABLE 4 
Potential Impact of a Selected NIT on Labour Supply 
and Income - Youth Females 
NIT Parameters: G (minimum guarantee level) = $5,000, 
«(négative tan rate); B (break-even income level) = $10,000. 
Pre-Subsidy Initial Per Cent Loss in Post- Final 
Income (X) Income Réduction in Earnings Subsidy Transfer 
($) Supplément Labour ($) Income ($) 
($) Supply E ($) FT 
I P X' 
0 5,000 — — 5,000 5,000 
3,000 3,500 64 1,920 5,540 4,460 
4,000 3,000 64 2,560 5,720 4,280 
5,000 2,500 64 3,200 5,900 4,100 
6,000 2,000 63 3,780 6,110 3,890 
7,000 1,500 63 • 4,410 6,295 3,705 
8,000 1,000 62 4,960 6,520 3,480 
9,000 500 62 5,580 6,710 3,290 
10,000 0 62 6,200 6,900 3,100 
Weighted Mean 
5,560 2,240 63 3,502 6,049 3,991 
NOTES: 
See Notes at the end of Table 3. 
13 In the U.S.A. the following four NIT experiments (more popularly known as 
Graduated Work Incentive Experiments) hâve been conducted: the New Jersey - Pennsylvania 
Experiment, the Rural Income Maintenance Experiment, the Garry (Indiana) Experiment, and 
the Seattle-Denver Experiment. For détails see PECHMAN, J. and TIMPANE, P.M. (éd.) 
1975; also see symposium articles on the subject in Journal of Human Resources, 9 (Spring, 
1974). 
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The NIT experiments in the U.S.A. hâve stimulated a great deal of ac-
tive interest in Canada. A NIT experiment called MINCOME MANITOBA 
is presently in progress14. It will be several years before any results become 
available from the Canadian experiment. The American experiments 
generally demonstrate absence of any significant disincentive effects in the 
case of prime-age maie heads of household. In the case of white wives, 
however, larger réductions in labour supply hâve often been reported. 
The labour supply implications of a NIT presented hère should be 
clearly distinguished from the results obtained from the actual négative in-
come tax experiments. The results of the NIT experiments show the expost 
response of the participants to a guaranteed annual income scheme and to 
changes in its parameters over time. In the approach adopted hère by con-
trast, we estimate the income and substitution effects of a change in the 
wage rate from a cross-section of individuals and use thèse estimâtes to 
dérive the likely labour supply effects of a NIT with hypothetical levels of 
minimum income subsidy and négative tax rates. Limitations common to a 
cross-section study, therefore, apply to the results. In particular, it has to be 
assumed that the cross-section findings across individuals can be used as 
valid predictors of unobserved time-series behaviour for individuals. 
Secondly, it is also necessary to assume that the estimated labour supply 
response to différent pretax wage rates in our cross-section data can be used 
probably by extrapolating outside the range of our wage rate observations 
to predict the response to différent combinations of income guarantee and 
tax rate. 
The results that are more relevant and somewhat more appropriate for 
comparison with those of the présent study are the empirical findings based 
on nonexperimental data. But a number of problems arise in an effort to 
compare the présent one with thèse. First, as far as this author is aware 
there is no similar study based on non-experimental data for Canada. The 
previous empirical évidence in this area is ail based on the U.S. data. Se-
cond, thèse U.S. studies usually focus on prime âge maies and married 
females or female family heads. There is hardly any relevant évidence on 
younger workers. Third, most studies report on hours of market work and 
not weeks as in the présent study. Finally, the impact of a NIT plan dépends 
not only upon the parameters of the plan and the income and substitution 
parameters, but also upon the equilibrium wage rate and labour supply. 
Thèse are very often not reported. 
14 See HIKEL et al (1974). 
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Inspite of the difficulties and problems mentioned above, a few 
selected studies hâve been listed in Table 5 to provide an idea about how the 
results of the présent study compare with others. The percentage réduction 
in labour supply (hours of work) is computed and shown in each case. To 
facilitate comparison, same program parameters hâve been assumed for the 
NIT plan and equilibrium values of the wage rate, labour supply etc.15 (See 
notes at the end of Table 5) 
The percentage réductions in labour supply as shown in Table 5 reflect 
only the différences in the income and substitution elasticity parameters ob-
tained in various studies. They do not reflect the sample characteristics since 
the equilibrium (mean) wage rate, labour supply etc. hâve been assumed to 
be the same in ail cases. 
One of the main empirical findings of the présent study that propor-
tionately there would be a greater réduction in the labour supply of younger 
females than maies seems to be quite reasonable. Women especially the 
married ones hâve a wider variety of nonmarket uses of time in housekeep-
ing and child care than men. A négative tax by reducing the effective wage 
rate would induce a greater substitution of non-market work for market 
work in the case of females than maies. Men, on the contrary, are more 
committed to labour market than women due to the existing institutional 
structure. The above finding is also consistent with the available empirical 
évidence as is indicated by Table 516. 
15 Since several researchers report only elasticity parameters instead of income and 
substitution effects, Equation (3) is rewritten in elasticity form by multiplying the first term by 
(L/L) and the second term by (W/W), and thus: 
dL « - L ES da + _ _ 1 _ _ E^ [dG - (WL + Y) d a ] 
(1 - a ) W(l - a ) 
where: 
E s = Substitution Elasticity evaluated at the sample means and is equal to 
U w/ au = o T 
E^ = Income Elasticity evaluated at the sample means and is equal to 
__(* • V 
W, L = mean wage rate and labour supply respectively. 
16 Also see, SMITH, 1975. 
TABLE 5 
Authors Data Source 
(i) For Maies 
1. The Présent Author Survey of Unemployed CMC 
Clients (Canada), 1970 
2. Telia, Telia and 
Green 
U.S. Survey of Economie 
Opportunity (SEO), 1967 
3. Greenberg and 
Kosters 
SEOa - 1967 
4. Boskin SEO - 1967 
5. Rosen and Welch U.S. Census, 1960 
(ii) For Females 
1. The Présent Author Survey of Unemployed CMC 
2. Telia, Telia and 
Green 
SEO - 1967 
3. Parker SEO - 1967 
4. Boskin SEO - 1967 
5. Kalachek and 
Raines 
CPS* - 1966 
6. Hall SEO - 1967 
Changes in Labour Supply Due to Introduction of a NIT -
Estimâtes Obtained from other Studies and the Présent Study 
Maies and Females 
Démographie Group 
14-24 years; income < $11,000 
Family Heads, 18-64, wage per 
hour, $3.00 
Married (maies) in labour force 62 
years; income <$15,000 
Husbands 20 to 59 (white) 
Employed Husbands, income 
<$10,000 
14-24 years, income < $11,000 
Wives, wage per hour $3.00 
Female head, poor, near poor 
with children 
Wives 21 to 59 
Females 21 to 64 - low-income 
families 
Wives 21 to 59 
Per cent 
Réduction in 
Labour Supply 
(Annual Hours 
of Work)** 
50 
30 
49 
* 
27 m 
r > H 
40 O Z 
Cfl 
Z 
a 
c 
m 61 H 
2 m 
r 
52 r m 
y* 
< 50 o 
r u> 
*>. 18 
•y 
O 
inn .&. 1UU ^—s 
VO 
- J 
100 VO 
> 
NOTES: 1. Compiled and computed from Cain and Watts (éd.) (1973). For further détails see Cain and Watts (éd.) 
(1973). Where a range of estimâtes has been provided by the author, the average of the two has been 
used. I c/3 
c 
2. The following parameters hâve been used for the NIT; G = $5,000 and a = .50. | 3 
3. The following equilibrium (mean) values hâve been used: W = mean hourly wage rate = $2.50; L = 
mean annual labour supply = 2,000 hours, Y = mean nonemployment income = 0; WL = mean fami- I | 
ly income = $5,000. ,
 n 
> 
a
 Survey of Economie Opportunity, U.S. ,
 Q 
Current Population Survey, U.S. 
The présent study uses weeks spent in the labour force as the labour supply measure. To facilitate comparison, the I
 > 
weeks measure has been converted into an annual hours measure by assuming the mean labour supply to be 2,000 Z 
hours annually and the mean wage to be $2.50 as has been done in the case of the other studies. This clearly in- o 
volves the assumption that the weeks and hours of market work hâve the same elasticity with respect to changes in 
wage rate and income. 
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Some spécial features of the data base and characteristics of the sample 
used in this study should be clearly borne in mind while interpreting the 
results. The sample used hère, as already noted, consisted of persons who 
personally visited Canada Manpower Centres for placement in jobs. Also, 
the sample included only those persons who were without employment dur-
ing the survey week. Thus the sample is likely to be more représentative of 
unemployed than the Canadian labour force in gênerai. Furthermore, it is 
not ail groups of unemployed who approach Canada Manpower Centres for 
services. It is basically "blue collar" workers with relatively high job tur-
nover rate who approach Canada Manpower Centres for assistance17. 
For policy making purposes, it is important that the analysis relates to 
the "working poor" which is the target group for an income maintenance 
program such as NIT. Although it is not precisely known how far the sam-
ple used is représentative of working poor of the youth population in 
Canada, it appears that NIT is likely to affect a sizable segment of this 
group consisting of relatively low-income workers engaged in low-wage oc-
cupations and experiencing a high rate of job turnover18. 
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Impôt négatif sur le revenu et l'offre de travail: 
quelques effets 
À partir du modèle économique traditionnel du choix entre le loisir et le revenu, 
sont estimées séparément à l'aide de régression linéaire à deux étapes dites des moin-
dres carrés doubles les fonctions d'offre de travail pour jeunes hommes et jeunes 
femmes. 
Cette procédure permet d'obtenir des simulations de l'effet de diverses com-
binaisons de taux de taxation négative et de transferts absolus de revenus sur l'offre 
de travail de ces groupes. 
L'étude démontre qu'un programme de taxation négative du revenu conduit à 
de fortes réductions dans l'offre de travail de ces groupes. Elle démontre aussi qu'un 
programme de taxation négative du revenu conduit à de fortes réductions dans l'of-
fre de travail des jeunes gens et plus particulièrement chez les femmes. 
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